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Corporate Social Responsibility in the Wake of the Asian Tsunami:  
An Empirical Study 
 
ABSTRACT 
This paper provides input on how the leaders of two leading Sri Lankan private sector organisations 
engaged in CSR initiatives during the first 11-months after the Asian tsunami. Amidst stakeholders’ 
overwhelming outpouring of spontaneity to engage in CSR activities, the paper reports on the decision-
making and leadership challenges of business leaders after a high magnitude human tragedy. The paper 
specifically examines as to what extent the CSR initiatives following the tsunami disaster were a 
reflection of leaders’ authentic moral conduct. Due to the magnitude of the devastation from the tsunami, 
one would assume that the CSR initiatives that follow such a massive natural disaster would be without 
any strategies for material gain or corporate reputation. The findings suggest otherwise. After mapping 
the corporate responses to the damage caused by the Asian tsunami, the study proposes a conceptual 
model.  
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INTRODUCTION 
The paper is based on my experiences as a Sri Lankan born expatriate-academic, researching into post-
tsunami leadership behaviour. I interviewed formal and informal donors, civil society leaders, business 
leaders and victims of the Asian tsunami. This paper aims to report the findings on the corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) of two leading Sri Lankan private sector organisations. It provides input on how 
these organisations engaged in CSR in the wake of the Asian tsunami. This paper is based on a case study 
methodology. The study addresses decision-making and leadership challenges in identifying appropriate 
CSR initiatives amidst various stakeholders’ overwhelming outpouring of spontaneity to engage in CSR 
activities. Vålanda and Heidea (2005) examined how a company can handle ‘bad episodes’ related to 
corporate social responsibility and introduced a conceptual model in which a corporate social 
responsibility event passes through three ‘regulators’ which influence the significance of the episode. 
Depending on the significance of the episode and influenced by the regulators, Vålanda and Heidea 
(2005) outlines three responsive strategies.  
 One was to follow a management strategy by applying existing CSR internal tools. This option is 
generally preferred the CSR incident is sufficiently small to be managed and employees in the company 
basically agree towards the response. If the management strategy fails, the researchers propose a second 
option; surgery strategy. Normally used for more significant incidents, surgical action may result in 
significant changes to the processes and people of the organization. If the surgery strategy fails, Vålanda 
and Heidea (2005) propose the need of a mitigation strategy. This strategy is used for more severe 
incidents, such as a large environmental disaster, where the focus is on managing the external variables.
 Noting that Vålanda and Heidea’s (2005) views were limited to company created ‘bad episodes’, 
the present study adopts their model to propose a new model for explaining CSR initiatives to ‘bad 
episodes’ such as natural disasters where the company had no direct influence.  
 The paper is organised as follows. I start with an introduction to basic concepts, and the state of 
CSR in Sri Lanka before the Asian tsunami. Thereafter I continue with the methodology and case 
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descriptions. The subsequent section includes findings, followed by discussions and managerial 
implications. In the final section, I discuss limitations and suggest further research.  
 The concept of corporate social responsibility has a long and an impressive history in the 
management literature (Windsor, 2001; Carroll, 1999 and 1979). Conceptually, Windsor (2001) notes that 
there are significant difficulties in distinguishing whether business behavior is truly moral conduct or 
instrumental adoption of an appearance of moral conduct as useful reputational strategy. He argues that 
voluntary acceptance of material loss may serve to identify moral conduct, but material gain cannot serve 
to isolate reputational strategy. Empirically, despite considerable effort in the academic literature to 
discover a reliable relationship between responsible conduct and financial performance, the evidence 
remains mixed at best (Windsor, 2001).  
This paper attempts to examine the question as to what extent were the CSR initiatives following 
the tsunami disaster a reflection of managers’ authentic moral conduct? Due to the magnitude of the 
devastation from the tsunami, one would assume that the CSR initiatives that follow such a massive 
natural disaster would be without of any strategies for material gain or corporate reputation. The findings 
of this study based on pioneering tsunami relief efforts by two private sector Sri Lankan organizations 
suggest otherwise. These two cases are selected due to several reasons. Unilever (Sri Lanka) is among the 
largest and oldest multinational companies in Sri Lanka. It has operated in Sri Lanka for over 70 years 
and employs over 1100 Sri Lankans. Brandix is the single largest exporter in Sri Lanka with an annual 
turnover that exceeds US$200 million. It directly employs 18,500 and generates indirect employment to 
an equivalent number. The pioneering social and environmental rehabilitation relief efforts of these two 
ogranisations had a significant impact on the Sri Lankan government and other leading local and overseas 
businesses. Before we turn to the events that unfolded in these two Sri Lankan business organisations, it 
would be useful to note the state of CSR in Sri Lanka before the tsunami.  
THE STATE OF CSR IN SRI LANKA BEFORE THE TSUNAMI 
The Asian tsunami has resulted in a mass launch of hundreds of formal CSR programmes in the Sri 
Lankan private sector. Business perspectives and practices in Sri Lanka are products of both the island’s 
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colonial trading past as well as its present turbulent political circumstances. Commerce in Sri Lanka is 
rooted in a long history of international trade with its former colonial powers – the Portuguese, the Dutch, 
and the British – as well as with neighbouring Asian countries. Private companies were formed in the 
early part of the 18th century, and Sri Lanka’s stock market was set up in the latter half of the 1800s. Sri 
Lanka has around 240 companies currently listed on the Colombo Stock Exchange. Privatisation, the 
opening of Sri Lanka to foreign investment and increased, domestic private investment have transformed 
Sri Lanka’s private sector into the country’s largest employer and most important source of revenue 
(International Alert, 2005).  
 In the first half of 2004, a comprehensive survey was undertaken by an international NGO, 
International Alert, on the CSR perceptions and attitudes of the Sri Lankan public and business 
organisations. The study explores perceptions on the wider social role of business in society and looks at 
CSR as a possible means to develop this role. This study consisted of two parts. The first, an island-wide 
household survey on the perceptions of the public on CSR. This survey was conducted with the aid of a 
semi-structured questionnaire, administered through face-to-face interviews with individuals from all age 
categories between 18 to 65 years, including both men and women.  
 The second study, also conducted with the aid of a semi-structured questionnaire, was 
administered through face-to-face interviews with individuals from the business community. A total of 
147 individuals from the business community were interviewed. In the capital of Colombo, the sample 
was selected to represent large-scale and prominent business organisations covering 10 specific industrial 
sectors. International Alert’s findings provide a snapshot of the state of the CSR in Sri Lanka before the 
tsunami. 
 International Alert’s (2005) study shows that a majority of the respondents interviewed (54.7%) 
agreed that large-scale/prominent businesses’ sole responsibility was to generate profits. But a significant 
proportion (28.8%) disagreed, 9.6% were undecided and 6.5% said they did not know. The study 
indicates that most Sri Lankans do not have a clear understanding of the role they wish businesses to play 
in society (International Alert, 2005). The public is uncertain whether business should focus solely on 
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profits, or engage in social issues. While a slight majority of people feel that business should do more for 
the social good, they mistrust corporations and express fears that the private sector exploits consumers 
and destroys cultural values.  In the business community, most respondents feel that they have a strong 
role to play in addressing social needs but, while there is a long history of charitable giving in Sri Lanka, 
few companies have a strategy or policy for doing so. They do not have a clear direction on how and what 
to contribute to society, and the benefits from doing so. 
 Only 73.2% of companies surveyed had a CSR policy. When those with a CSR policy were asked 
whether it was formal or informal, only 17% had formal, written policies. The majority (84.1%) of the 
companies are engaged in CSR because they genuinely want to contribute to the betterment of society, 
while 39% wanted to help build employee pride and commitment. 26.8% said CSR is part of their 
company mission; 13.4% say they adopt it for publicity reasons; 12.2% say it is because of the 
expectations of other businesses and civil society; and 2.4% said it is because of regulations and laws 
(International Alert, 2005). 
 When asked how long their organisations have been involved in specific (formal/informal) CSR 
policies, only 59.8% of companies have been actively involved for more than six years. Seven 
organisations have had CSR policies running for more than 30 years and one has been involved in the 
concept for 65 years. The majority of organisations engage in CSR activities relating to education 
(54.9%) but significant numbers focus on internal practices, such as employee welfare (51.2%) and 
unemployment issues (48.8%). A notable number of organisations engage in religious activities (36.6%), 
environmental concerns (31.7%), health (30.5%) and the provision of infrastructure facilities (28%). 
 When asked from the Sri Lankan public whether they had heard of the concept of CSR, 76.2% of 
respondents were aware of the concept, but 23.8% had never heard of it (International Alert, 2005). Thus 
International Alert’s (2005) study reveals that while businesses regard the practice of CSR as a genuine 
gesture, the public views it as self-interest. The majority of businesses say the main reason for their CSR 
policies is genuine concern for society, but a minority cites publicity as the primary purpose. The majority 
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public view, by contrast, is that businesses practise CSR policies for motives of publicity and only a 
minority believe that they have a genuine concern for society.  
 Given this backdrop, and while the International Alert’s study was literally being published for a 
January 2005 release, the Asian tsunami struck almost 70% of Sri Lanka’s coastline on December 26, 
2004. The estimated tsunami death toll ranges from 156,000 to 178,000 across 11 nations, with an 
additional 26,500 to 142,000 missing, most of them presumed dead (www.sciencemag.org). The tsunami 
devastated 1,000 km of Sri Lanka’s coastline leaving 31,000 Sri Lankans dead, 5,600 missing, more than 
15,000 people injured and 500,000 homeless (Jayaratne, 2005). Most affected sectors included coastal 
livelihoods dependent largely on fisheries, tourism, agriculture and small businesses. Total job losses are 
estimated at 380,000. The estimated damage to infrastructure includes 150,000 homes, 200 educational 
institutions and 100 health facilities. Railway, power, telecommunications, water supply, and fishing ports 
also suffered significant damage. In addition to the deepened poverty for thousands already suffering 
from over two decades of war, the long-term impact includes an additional 250,000 people will falling 
below the poverty line. The Government of Sri Lanka and international financial institutions estimate 
reconstruction will cost US$1.6 billion, primarily to rebuild key coastal infrastructure and re-establish 
livelihoods. 
 The resulting damage and loss of life has ironically, brought in a new chapter in the CSR 
practices of Sri Lankan business organisations. It is to these post tsunami CSR practices that we now turn. 
METHODOLOGY 
Data Collection 
The paper is based on my experiences as a Sri Lankan born expatriate-academic, researching into post-
tsunami leadership behaviour, both in Sri Lanka and internationally, and 21 interviews I had with formal 
and informal donors, civil society leaders, business leaders and victims of the Asian tsunami. It provides 
input on how the leaders of two leading Sri Lankan private sector organisations engaged in CSR 
initiatives during the first 11-months after the Asian tsunami. The fieldwork was conducted during the 
latter half of November 2005; nearly 11 months after the tsunami struck the Sri Lankan coast.  
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 The primary method of data collection was in-depth, face-to-face interviews. A semi-structured 
interview guide was used. The average participant interview was about 90 minutes. In the interview, 
participants were encouraged to reflect upon what the 2004 Boxing Day tsunami meant to them and how 
it has influenced their leadership and decision-making on natural disaster related CSR initiatives. To 
observe moods and hesitancies in response to specific questions, all interviews were videotaped. 
Additional probing questions were interwoven during each interview to seek verification and explanation. 
To seek the participants’ perspectives on the phenomenon under study, the interview guide was based on 
an open-ended format. This format was used to encourage participants to share information in a style that 
they were comfortable with.    
 According to Miles and Huberman (1994), the key to ensuring the quality of data in a study of 
this type is to link three levels of understanding—(i) the meanings and interpretations of the participants; 
(ii) the researcher’s interpretation of those meanings; and (iii) confirmatory analysis. Unfortunately, this 
linking process cannot be made explicit in this paper because data collection was governed by a 
confidentiality agreement. Data triangulation was, therefore, used to ensure the quality of the data, 
together with multiple methods of confirmatory analysis including methodological triangulation (Seale, 
2000).  
 With respect to data triangulation, to strengthen and verify the use of the interview data, 
additional information was sought through the review of relevant company and public documents. These 
consisted of company reports on CSR initiatives, as well as electronic and print media reports on business 
leaders’ and organisations’ tsunami related CSR activities.  
Case Descriptions 
Unilever (Sri Lanka) 
Unilever (Sri Lanka) is among the largest and oldest multinational companies in Sri Lanka. It has 
operated in Sri Lanka for over 70 years and employs over 1100 Sri Lankans, none of whom succumbed to 
the tsunami. The company currently conducts a wide range of FMCG operations in the urban and rural 
sectors.  The interviews were conducted with two of the most senior directors and one junior director in 
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the top management team. It was one of the few Colombo-based organisations that had a formal CSR 
programme before the tsunami. 
Brandix 
An apparel manufacturer, this family owned business operation is supported by over 20 manufacturing 
facilities in Sri Lanka and abroad, as well as marketing offices in New York and London. Brandix is the 
single largest exporter in Sri Lanka with an annual turnover that exceeds US$200 million. It directly 
employs 18,500 and generates indirect employment to an equivalent number. The interview was 
conducted with the chairman of the company. It is also one of the large Colombo based organisations that 
had a formal CSR programme before the tsunami. 
FINDINGS: MANAGING CORPORATE REPUTATION AND LEADING 
SPONTANEOUS EMOTION 
All interviewees described the post tsunami experience using the phrase ‘CSR’. Both companies had 
formal CSR initiatives in place. For Unilever, it revolved around the 3G mantra, our brands, our people 
and our community. Reflecting the worldwide corporate mission of Unilever Plc, adding vitality to life, 
the Sri Lankan Unilever operations attempted to deliver positive results to the community when pursuing 
its brand and people goals. Both organisations admitted that they ‘played to their strengths’, meaning 
shaping the tsunami CSR response in terms of proven organisational resources and techniques, or internal 
tools. For Unilever, it was the strong and deep island wide distribution network. In the immediate 
aftermath of the tsunami, Unilever moved quickly to make distribution networks available to emergency 
relief operations, working alongside local agencies to distribute essential food and hygiene products and 
matched employee donations to a central fund. Initial relief work was followed by rehabilitation and 
reconstruction projects. These include the rebuilding of 150 homes in Sri Lanka. 
 For Brandix, it was their already established CSR initiatives on water based projects. Brandix 
believes in providing water to as many needy communities as possible. Brandix engineering teams have 
constructed and maintained desalination plants in strategically located areas along the southern and 
western coastal belt. The process is two-fold: firstly, they convert sea water into fresh, drinkable water, 
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and secondly, distribute this to the local populace through efficient and effective mechanisms available. 
Brandix’s long-term corporate social responsibility programme is to build new desalination plants every 
year. During the aftermath of the tsunami, they found that most of the water wells in the affected areas 
were contaminated with sea water. With the help of a government agency and in-house environmental 
engineers, Brandix cleaned 4000 water wells along the whole of the affected coastal belt. The chairman of 
Brandix believes that this CSR initiative cut across all ethnic and religious communities. 
 All interviewees elaborated on the nature of decision-making and leadership that was required to 
effectively and efficiently channel organisational resources to the most wanted. According to the Brandix 
leader, decision-making was hard. He said;  
 These (tsunami related CSR decisions) were similar to the decisions I had to make under  terrorist  
 threats on my life to close down the factories and delay shipments. Then I had  to make the 
 call, and I did. At that time, we had never experienced any thing like that before. 
Amongst the outpouring of emotions and spontaneity ‘to do something’, he admitted of being accused by 
his employees of making cold business calls during the aftermath of the tsunami disaster. For example, he 
said; 
I had to make hard decisions. There was panic and I was concerned about wasting resources. 
I had to order everyone to work and meet the shipping deadlines because in the apparel 
industry, missing deadlines is committing suicide. A small group of employees were reluctant 
because they thought it was a hard, cold commercial decision. But for me, grief without a 
plan is more grief. While the factories were running, I decided that some employees should 
form into teams and we should go to those areas that no one has been to. So we sent several 
teams in a convoy carrying tents and basic emergency items to neglected areas especially in 
the East.  
Similarly, Unilever directors believed in ‘nuturing the golden goose’ whilst continuing with emergency 
relief efforts. In the absence of the chairman who was overseas, the senior directors made a decision to get 
back to work, keep the factories running whilst emergency help was being provided. With its strong 
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distribution network perhaps no other Sri Lankan organisation could boast of, Unilever employees 
traveled to remote areas and were the first to get to most of the Eastern towns. They assisted the World 
Food Programme in logistical support by chartering a train to deliver emergency food rations and medical 
supplies.  
 In terms of drivers to CSR initiatives connected with the tsunami, publicity became a contentious 
topic in all interviews. According to the Unilever senior team, they wanted to do the ‘right thing’. Right in 
terms of providing what is appropriate to the affected people and right according to their concisions. The 
question they tried to answer was given the same resources, whether they would engage in the same 
activities in a similar manner if they were carried out outside the ‘corporate hat’, as private individuals. 
Initially, they decided that Unilever should not use the tsunami CSR initiatives for enhancing the 
corporate image. However, according to the senior management team, in the absence of any publicity to 
their CSR initiatives, their stakeholders, both national and international, had wanted to know Unilever’s 
contribution to the tsunami relief effort. There had been increasing pressure from these stakeholders 
because some have channeled their resources through the company to direct them to affected areas. For 
example, ex-employees who were living abroad have sent funds to Unilever to be used in the relief effort. 
Hence, Unilever became concerned with the situation and decided to engage in ‘stakeholder awareness’. 
According to the management team, ‘the Board decided to engage in focused awareness of our efforts as 
opposed to a shotgun approach’. They felt that this was appropriate because it was ‘more of a 
responsibility to account for our stakeholders than a strategy to exploit the tsunami for cheap commercial 
gain’. One senior director said; 
 As much as we didn’t want to wave a flag, we needed to do the right thing by our conscience 
 as well as seen doing the right thing because our stakeholders were expecting us to be seen. 
 Stakeholders had to see the right thing been done--corporate image was important. 
Thus the leadership at Unilever had to adopt a careful awareness building campaign which did not exploit 
the human tragedy as an opportunity for publicity but at the same time ensuring that ‘the company image 
was not adversely affected of not being seen to be doing’. Thus a quarter of the initial 100 million LKR 
 11
received from the parent company was donated to the government and ‘we decided to take whatever 
publicity that came with it because it was important that the government recognized the efforts of leading 
multinationals in the country.’ 
 In terms of leadership challenges posed by tsunami related CSR initiatives, all leaders admitted 
that the fundamentals of leading were similar to resolving a day-to-day business crisis. However, they 
mentioned that the approach of influencing their followers were different. The Brandix leader explained: 
‘Leadership was the key, nobody wanted to take decisions. Emotions were raw and I had to be more 
empathetic and tolerant of their spontaneity’. For example when he decided to organise and send one 
convoy to all the affected areas, ‘the heads of different SBUs reacted. They wanted to send their people to 
where they had factories so their presence was felt in those communities. I had to give in’.  
 In terms of the emotion and spontaneity that was involved in the CSR initiatives of the 
organisations, Brandix chairman said he experiences similar outpouring of emotion and spontaneity ‘in 
small pockets’ during day-to-day business operations. However when all 18000 followers were thinking 
of achieving the same goal, the intense emotions and spontaneity ‘has to be managed, to say the least’. 
These sentiments were echoed by the Unilever senior team as well. The G3 mantra at Unilever is our 
brands, our people and our community. Reflecting the parent company’s mission of adding vitality to life, 
‘we in Sri Lanka decided that all our activities directed to achieve successes in our brands and people 
should also have a positive impact on our communities’. So, in terms of leadership challenges, one senior 
director said, ‘the tsunami related CSR initiatives nicely fitted in with the G3 mantra already in place’. 
However, he said that the emotions and the spontaneity had to be clearly directed.  
The spontaneity in which people responded to the disaster was overwhelming. It came from 
the heart; non-rationalised outpouring of action. No overtime was claimed by anyone of the 
employees for the massive number of hours put in for the relief work.  
He admitted that he had not ‘led something like this before, ever. It was a far more emotional experience’. 
Contrasting ‘normal’ company events as ‘a job to be done where tasks are more rational and structured’, 
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this senior Unilever director said, ‘here it was all heart, came from within.’ Whilst curtailing spontaneity, 
he said; 
 …the unique leadership challenge in this disaster related CSR was to how to get the best out 
 of the overwhelming desire to help. Guidance, structure and a clinical management approach 
 was needed. Clear direction and clarity to the purpose at hand had to be provided 
 immediately. 
In terms of personal reflections, he said; 
 Two words--fulfillment and a sense of frustration! There is a limit to how much we 
 could do and the frustration we felt consequently with government bureaucracy. For  
 example, we got LKR100 million in a matter of hours but government approval is still 
 pending after 11 months. We haven’t been able to handover a single house yet. 
 
Summary of events leading to disaster related CSR outcomes 
 Unilever Brandix 
Within 24 hours Board meeting Board meeting 
Initial Fund 100 million LKR from parent 
company  
N/A 
Decision-making Informal gathering of directors and 
employees 
Board Meeting 
Employee involvement Voluntary donation of a day’s wage, 
voluntary time  
Voluntary employee time 
Short-term CSR outcomes 25 million 
Emergency aid to the furthest corners 
Emergency hotlines for 
marooned employees, 
volunteer employee teams, 
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of the island tents  
Long-term CSR outcomes 75 million 
Building 150 houses, hospital 
refurbishment, logistical support to 
the World Food Programme 
Water wells 
Integrated relief efforts 
with the existing CSR 
platform 
3G mantra: our community Water: 4000 water wells 
Stronger ties with NGOs 
and government 
25 million to government, logistical 
support to the World Food 
Programme 
South African Charity 
 
 
DISCUSSION: CSR REGULATORS AND OUTCOMES 
After the Asian tsunami struck Sri Lanka on Sunday, 26 December 2004, each of the two organisations 
initiated CSR programmes. However, each organisation’s CSR response and outcomes were different.  It 
seems that CSR responses of the two organisations in the wake of the Asian tsunami were moderated or 
regulated by two different factors. CSR drivers lead to increased emphasis on CSR. Increased awareness 
among stakeholders, public media interest and more integration/higher interdependencies between 
companies are some examples. Companies are facing increased demands for transparency and growing 
expectations that they measure, report, and continuously improve their social, environmental and ethical 
performance (Vålanda and Heidea, 2005). Growing public media interest tends to reinforce the 
stakeholder awareness. More integration and higher interdependencies between actors mean that firms are 
increasingly held accountable for the practices of their business partners throughout the value chain. Thus, 
a CSR event which occurs in the upstream part of the supply chain, can easily lead to a flow-on effect for 
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the actors further down in the chain. For example, by contributing 100million LKR within a matter of 
hours after the tsunami struck Sri Lanka, Unilever’s top management in the UK head office played a 
major role in initiating and setting the tone of the Unilever (Sri Lanka)’ CSR response.  
 CSR Internal Tools refer to the firm’s own rules, processes and structures that safeguard a 
‘socially responsible’ company. Literature shows that companies differ in the way they implement 
corporate social responsibility. Some companies concentrate on a single area such as environmental and 
ethical issues while others aim to integrate a CSR vision into all aspects of their operations. For example 
while Unilever’s focus on CSR was community based projects, Brandix’s focus was on environmental 
CSR. If CSR is to be regarded as an integral part of business decision-making, it merits a prominent place 
in a company’s core mission, vision and strategic documents. These are simple but important statements 
that succinctly state a company’s goals and aspirations beyond making a profit. Measurements, auditing 
and reporting are tools to strengthen internal efforts to comply with the company’s CSR policy and 
thereby build trust with external stakeholders.  
 The CSR drivers and internal tools constitute regulators, which may reduce or amplify the effects 
of the CSR response. In some situations the impact of the CSR event may nearly diminish because public 
media show no interest in the episode or the company has the necessary tools to defuse the situation. In 
other circumstance, the incident may cause a significant uproar because it is illegal or in conflict with 
internal rules of conduct and ends up as a front-page story in the leading newspapers (Vålanda and 
Heidea, 2005). 
 The main outcomes from natural disaster related CSR events could be classified into emergency, 
short-term and long-term approaches. In the first 11 months after the tsunami, apart from the emergency 
relief during the first few weeks, almost all of the CSR initiatives of the two organisations were directed 
at improving social development and the livelihood of those affected by the tsunami. These included 
construction of houses, hospitals, schools and water wells.  
 The resulting findings can be summarized in the following conceptual model, which also 
illustrates the relatedness between the constructs (see Figure 1).  
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CSR 
outcomes Regulators 
 
Figure 1. Conceptual Model  
In the above model, company expectations are shaped by the leadership and decision-making involved 
with natural disaster related CSR initiatives. In terms of leadership, the findings suggest that ‘playing to 
your strengths’ as a key criterion for success in natural disaster related CSR initiatives. The internal tools 
linked to the existing CSR platform could shape and form the CSR initiatives related to such a natural 
disaster. Each organisation benefited from a dedicated disaster relief team that led and guided the relief 
effort. These original teams were engaged in long-term CSR initiatives 11 months after the tsunami. 
Although the two case studies did not generate any evidence to suggest the pursuit of direct material gain 
from the tsunami, a company’s expectation to exploit natural disasters such as the Asian tsunami for 
direct material gain could also affect its CSR outcomes.  
 Depending on the significance of the episode and influenced by the regulators, Vålanda and 
Heidea (2005) suggest that company CSR initiatives could be management, surgical or mitigative. Earlier 
it was noted that while Vålanda and Heidea’s (2005) views were limited to company created ‘bad 
episodes’, the present study adopts their model to propose a new model for explaining CSR initiatives to 
‘bad episodes’ where the company had no direct influence. The focus of Vålanda and Heidea’s (2005) 
study on company’s CSR initiatives towards a critical incident has been one of magnitude. In the present 
study, the focus was one of immediacy of response. If we were to consider each of Vålanda and Heidea’s 
Natural 
disaster 
(CSR 
event)  
Company 
expectation 
Drivers 
Emergency 
Short-term 
Internal 
tools Long-term 
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(2005) three response strategies against the time horizons of the present study, because management 
strategies could be implemented with existing CSR internal tools and with almost complete agreement of 
employees, they are more likely to be emergency oriented CSR outcomes. The second option surgery 
strategy is more likely to generate short term CSR outcomes because it would take more time for 
companies to make significant changes to the processes and people of the organisation. In the case of 
mitigation strategies, as in the case of company generated ‘bad episodes’, in cases involving natural 
disasters, the focus is on securing the long term reputation and survival of the company.  
 
MANAGERIAL IMPLICATIONS 
 managerial implications for decision-making and leadership. In 
doing the right thing—right in terms of the affected individual’s 
The findings of this study have two major
spite of the great tolerance and empathy required to maneuver the CSR intiatives in this natural disaster, 
cold and hard business decisions also had to be made. However, rational decision-making seems to have 
little significance during the first 48 hours after a natural disaster. Decision-making from the ‘heart’ could 
be more significant. Both organisations reported very little rationalistion in allocating millions of LKR as 
initial funding for the CSR initiatives.  
 Several interviewees spoke of 
perspective and from one’s own cons ions. The study reveals the significant role a human tragedy plays in 
shaping some leaders’ desire to make ‘right’ decisions. The findings of this study support Shakun’s 
(2001) notion of unbounded rationality that decisions are bound not only by cognitive abilities but also by 
affective and conative faculties. Conation refers to the connection of knowledge and affect to behaviour, 
and is associated with the question of ‘why?’ something has happened. It is the personal, intentional, 
goal-oriented or striving component of motivation—the proactive (as opposed to reactive or habitual) 
aspect of behaviour (Huitt, 1999). It is defined as the use of will or the freedom to make choices about 
what to do. According to Huitt (1999), conation becomes critical when an individual wants to 
successfully engage in self-direction and self-regulation.  
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 Shakun also points out that ‘right’ decision-making and ‘rightness’ originate from spirituality—
that is, a consciousness experiencing oneness (authors, 2006). Shakun (2001: 112–113) refers to this 
decision-making process in terms of ‘unbounded rationality’ and claims that it is ‘the rationality that 
ultimately matters, that requires and delivers spirituality’—our ultimate purpose and value. ‘Right’ 
decision-making is rational or reasonable not only in terms of achieving its goals in terms of cognitive 
abilities, but also in terms of the ability to experience and act according to a connection with a larger, 
ultimate whole. Based on these observations by Shakun, we might speculate that business leaders 
confronted with a massive natural disaster CSR initiatives will tend to try to go beyond the rational and 
bounded to the unbounded or spiritually-motivated decision-making processes in order to make effective 
‘right’ decisions. When leaders are challenged to the extent that they need to reach deeper and draw from 
their value system to find the ‘right way’ of managing the situation, it is likely that their decision-making 
process plays a major, if not the dominant, role in determining the outcome. 
 Turning to implications to leadership, unlike in day-to-day business operations, the tsunami 
disaster relief effort needed little follower motivation and inspiration. On the contrary, the outpouring of 
‘heart’ and emotion that follows such tragedies needs to be properly channeled and guided. Leaders in 
these situations need to be more tolerant and empathetic towards followers. They have to give into 
follower pressures to follow a particular course of action. Thus a mixture of participation and contingency 
leadership styles would seem appropriate. Fry (2005; 2003) found empirical support to conclude that a 
spirituality-based leadership theory offers promise as a springboard for a new paradigm for leadership 
theory and emphasized the need to extend transformational leadership theories. Relatively newer 
theoretical contributions that explore the spiritual dimensions of leadership such as transcendental theory 
of leadership (Cardona, 2000; Sanders III, Hopkins and Geroy, 2003) seem more relevant to the 
leadership challenges posed by natural disaster related CSR initiatives. These researchers propose that the 
transcendental theory comprises of the managerial aspects of transactional theory and the charismatic 
aspects of transformational theory to enhance leader effectiveness. Perhaps the application of 
 18
transcendental and spiritual leadership theories could help identify the extent to which the CSR initiatives 
following the tsunami disaster a true reflection of leaders’ authentic moral conduct.   
LIMITATIONS 
The case studies have been developed based on interviews with the top management team of each 
organisation. The data collected through these interviews could have been triangulated with other 
‘insider’ sources from within these organisations. Furthermore, by employing cases from only Colombo 
based organisations, the results and applicability is limited. On the other hand the purpose of the study is 
not to test the external validity of the findings, but rather to explore and generate hypotheses and ideas.  
CONCLUSION AND FURTHER RESEARCH 
International Alert’s survey conducted prior to the Asian tsunami revealed that only 20.1% of the 
households believed companies are engaged in society friendly activities because businesses ‘really want 
to do some good’. A majority (69.9%) said that businesses engage in such activities for ‘publicity’; 9.8% 
said they are responding to ‘external pressures from business or civil society organisations’; and 7.3% 
said that it is ‘because of regulations and laws’. A similar study could be conducted in post tsunami Sri 
Lanka to assess any shift in the public opinion on why companies engage in CSR activities.  
 CSR is in the embryonic stage and several issues regarding frameworks, measurements, and 
empirical methods are yet to be resolved. Among the numerous challenges in this emerging research field, 
I suggest further studies of the role of individual spirituality in shaping CSR initiatives, especially in 
connection with high magnitude natural disaster events such as the Asian tsunami. Furthermore, studies 
could be undertaken on the relationship between high magnitude natural disaster related CSR initiatives 
and business benefits. Or to be more specific, studies that focus on how the interplay between drivers 
such as publicity and media, benefits the company and society.  
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